Author, René Floriot. Translated by, 赵淑美, 张洪竹. Publisher, 法律出版社, ISBN, , Length, pages. Export Citation. René Floriot. Harrap, – Biography & Autobiography – pages Biography & Autobiography / Lawyers & Judges · Judicial error · Law / Judicial Power. Libros de Segunda Mano – Ciencias, Manuales y Oficios – Derecho, Economía y Comercio: Los errores judiciales – rené floriot – Compra, venta y subastas.
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Search the history of over billion web pages on the Internet. Full text of ” Vichy Political Dilemma ” See other formats At the time of the events which provide the substance of this book, the author followed the news of France appearing in the newspaper press with the same general interest as other Americans and with a more particular concern arising out of his vocation as a student and teacher specializing in the history of modern France.
He had no other, more personal, involvement in jydiciales was transpiring in France. At that time and for some years afterward, moreover, his studies in the history of France centered in the period between the Revolution of and the First World War, so that his interest in the current news of France was no different from that of others in America who were concerned with the world-wide problems of public affairs in our time.
In the fall of the author was invited to spend a semester in re- search at the Institute of Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey. During these months he took part in a seminar, under the chairman- ship of the late Professor Edward Meade Earle, dealing with problems of France since In this seminar also participated a number of other American, British, and French scholars concerned with modern France. In the course of ereores discussions in this seminar, the author came to the conviction that it would be worthwhile to reexamine the experi- ence of France under the German occupation, to discover what new light this might throw on both the history of France in the period and on the course of affairs since At the conclusion of VI PREFACE the meetings of the seminar, he proceeded to France, where he spent the remainder of florioh academic year and the summer of in research on this topic.
The work continued to engage his attention for another two rehe after his return to America to judicales his duties as a member of the Department of History edrores the University of Wis- consin. For the research on which this study is based, the author received grants of financial assistance from the Institute for Advanced Study, the Social Science Research Council, and the University of Wisconsin.
He is also under a debt to members of the staff of the General Library errorss the University of Wisconsin, who have been generous in honoring his requests for the purchase of materials relating to this problem and have been helpful beyond the call of duty in locating fugitive items. In expressing his thanks, however, the author is in conscience bound to make plain that he alone is accountable for his opinions.
Les Erreurs judiciaires | National Library of Australia
None of the institutions which have given him assistance in his fporiot is re- sponsible for the views expressed in this judifiales. Taking as its protagonists the men who participated in or gave their active support to this gov- ernment, it seeks to throw light on the circumstances that brought them into positions of leadership or prominence, the problems they encoun- tered and the solutions they proposed in their endeavor to meet the issues of a period of deep national judicia,es, and the ideas upon which they purported to base their actions.
The story of the men of Vichy is charged with the most intense political passions. In the view erdores some, it is a chronicle of the vilest treason; the dark record of the triumph fortunately, only temporary of a long-premeditated conspiracy to deliver France to her hereditary enemy; the story of men who betrayed their country either for a crass personal profit or for motives of a narrow class or partisan interest.
In the view of others, on the contrary, Vichy judicialles the Calvary of a small band of high-minded patriots who chose not to shirk the responsibility of governing their nation under the most painful circum- stances and who risked their lives and honor in a desperate struggle to preserve the interests of their countrymen all this only to incur the abuse of exiles who fled their homeland in its time of crisis and later to suffer the ingratitude of the populace for whose welfare the men of Vichy had labored.
Those who were involved in the struggle that divided France into two hostile camps as soon as her government withdrew from the war whether they took their stand with Vichy or with its adversaries were 4 PROLOGUE sure that History would vindicate their position. We cannot have high hopes of hearing its ultimate verdict, however, since even now we can scarcely catch the whispered judgment of History upon issues as far removed from the present as those that rent France during the Revolution of At any event, the ordinary historian in our time will find it virtually impossible to render perfect justice.
Few Frenchmen of our generation can review the evidence without having prejudged the debate. No judicialea abroad, lacking intimate knowledge of the circumstances of each case, can hope to distinguish between those men who served Vichy solely from low motives and those who served with an honorable intent For certainly there were patriots who chose to serve under Marshal Petain in Vichy as there were also men of selfless heroism who joined General de Gaulle in London or the “Resistance” in France, at the very moment when the Axis seemed to have gained sure mastery of France and reached the threshold of world dominion.
And unquestionably there were scoundrels of the worst sort who ultimately gained leading posi- tions in the Vichy regime just as there were men who joined the opposi- tion abroad or at home, particularly as the day of liberation drew near, simply from motives of personal opportunism.
It will not be a major pur- pose of this study, however, to assess praise or blame among individuals, although inevitably it will imply some kind of estimation of the dozen or so leading personalities of the regime. Not only would it be presumptuous to divide the men of Vichy into patriots and traitors it would be fatuous.
For most of these men were neither heroes nor villains. Like their adversaries, they were, rather, men who acted from a mixture of high and low motives, in search of both public and private interest. Therein lies the fascination in the study of Vichy.
For this brief epi- sode in the history of France provides a microcosm in which are to be PROLOGUE 5 observed nearly all the nuances of human behavior in a time of deep political and moral crisis. To be sure, the story of Vichy does not include the whole range of the human drama.
It gives no illustration of the kind of heroism that lends moral grandeur to the saga of the “Resist- ance. The issues of the times were much too dire to permit even bitter laughter. Yet it errpres include what, under happier circumstances, would have seemed farcical buffoonery and the ludicrous posturing of timeservers who today explain away all that yesterday they proclaimed as eternal high principle. And at mo- ments it reveals the stoic dignity of men who did what had to be done, no matter how much they loathed the task.
Yet the most striking impression the observer garners in the study of Vichy is one of tragedy not quite floiot, but embodying something of that inexorable doom within the man which the Greek tragedists sought to portray. For the most characteristic of the various kinds of men who figured in the Vichy regime was not the blackguard who sold his coun- trymen for his own gain, quite without pretense of principle, nor the patriot who steeled himself to loathsome deeds because the interests of the nation required them.
Rather, it was the man of ordinary good will who at the outset recognized that collaboration with the enemy was a painful necessity, as indeed it was, but who thereafter became the pris- oner of this initial decision and continued in the course of service to the enemy even after this no longer was the path of the national or of his personal interest.
The man of this sort was a tragic victim of his own logic, dragged on to his doom as though by an evil genius. Regardless of such human interest, some observers regard the serious study of Vichy as a vain endeavor, for the reason judicisles that regime was essentially rerores function of the momentary hegemony of Nazi Germany. In this view, the men of Vichy were merely the puppets of a monster whose birth and death occurred outside the bounds of France.
Hence, they have no history of their own. Certainly there is an element of truth in this view. Nevertheless, the Vichy regime has real historical importance because of the light it throws on the history of France between the two World Wars. This is an apt observation. Sooner or later, the ad- herents of Vichy included both the old monarchist opposition to the Third Republic and the newer fascist and protofascist opposition in- deed, virtually all the critics of the liberal republican tradition save the Communists.
At the same rime, it is no less valid to regard Vichy as judicialles extension of the Third Republic. Not only was this regime instituted by the vote of the overwhelming majority of the elected representatives of the nation, under the procedure prescribed by the Constitution of In the ill- assorted band that proclaimed its devotion to Marshal Petain one can discern both authoritarians and parliamentarians, fascists heralding the “New Order” of Hitler and royalists lauding the golden age of the Bourbons, socialists who hailed the age of the common man and busi- ness magnates who rejoiced in becoming once more “masters in their own homes 1 ‘ in short, quite the same adversaries who had fought one another so bitterly under the Third Republic.
Yet the “National Revolution” of Marshal Petain defined as its special mission the task of ridding France of the evil heritage of the Third Re- public and reestablishing the life of the nation juxiciales a new foundation. Noting the stubborn persistence of the old order, despite the intentions of the new regime, the observer cannot help but gain a new appreciation of how durable was the pattern of political life that France had developed under the Third Republic.
In much the same manner, Vichy illuminates the Fourth Republic. The National Revolution which Vichy proclaimed was but the first of two attempts, in close succession, to wipe the slate clean and devise new social and political institutions for France. The second such venture began in the millennial atmosphere at the close of the war, when the provisional government that succeeded Vichy undertook once more to regenerate the nation. Yet within a short time it became apparent that the Fourth Republic was not so much different from the Third.
Thus Vichy and its sequel, taken together, give strik- ing indication of those characteristics of French life in the middle of the twentieth century which seem immutable.
For florikt customs and institu- tions that have withstood both Petain and De Gaulle are deep-rooted indeed. Moreover, the Vichy regime affords a new perspective on the posi- tion of France in European fliriot relations.
Judicialds is significant, not merely, nor even mainly, for what it reveals concerning the problem of the relations between France and Germany. Rather, it is notable for what it suggests as to the readiness of the French to accept their exclusion from a leading rank among world powers.
Even in the aftermath of judiciaoes First World War, some Frenchmen were dimly aware that France was unequal to the task of maintaining a position of diplomatic preemi- nence, but not until the epoch of Vichy did a French government frankly accept a position in the second rank of powers. Only then did French- men begin to speak of France as though she were one of the reme of lesser might in a world torn by struggle between foriot antagonists.
At the close of the Uudiciales World War, new rivals became the adversaries in the titanic contest for mastery of the world Soviet Russia and the United States superseding Britain and Germany. But the basic situation, as it bore upon France, was to remain the juciciales. And a large segment of French opinion under the Fourth Republic was to continue to think of France, as had some of the men of Vichy, as of floript satellite of one or the other of these mightier antagonists, or else as of an arbiter between them.
Indeed, the more we study the men of Vichy, the more we incline to look beyond the judicialex themselves to the problems they faced. These men have interest and importance mainly because they labored to solve a number of problems that had beset France before their rise to promi- nence and that were to prove no less vexatious after their downfall. Hence, in any broad view of France in the twentieth century, Vichy must take its place as one phase in the continuous inner crisis of modern France.
It must appear as one of the chapters in the uninterrupted course of French history. Indeed, France under Vichy provides perhaps the best place in which to examine the Nazi rule in Europe. The reason is that the Nazis did not rate the French, as a people, either at the top of their scale or at the bottom. Clearly, France did not belong among the partners in the Axis, along with Spain and Italy. Nor did she rank among the privileged “Nordic” satellites. But neither were the French classified with the “semicivilized” or even “subhuman” Slavic peoples.
Perhaps because the Nazis had neither a wholly favorable nor a wholly unfavorable view of the French nation, they showed an ambivalence in their relations with Vichy that probably pervaded their entire policy toward Europe, though it never became so clearly manifest in their relations with other countries. For the Nazis never quite made up their minds whether to deal with conquered France simply by exploiting their military victory on the hallowed principle of vae metis or to make France their starting point in an attempt to reorganize Europe on the basis of a “New Order,” in which the Germans would retain leadership of Europe but would renounce their opportunity to reduce other nations to servitude, and in which therefore the peoples of Europe would live and prosper together in peace.
Because they did not consistently pursue either course, their government never harvested the advantage which it hoped to realize from the triumph of the German armies. Yet a govern- ment is seldom indecisive merely because of a weakness of character.
Usually it hesitates because it is obliged to choose between errors neither of which gene a errires promise of advantage. Thus the study of Vichy suggests that Germany under the Nazis, no less than France under Petain, was caught in a dilemma. But the experience of France under German domination holds a meaning that transcends its relevance to the history of the Second World War.
For in the middle of the twentieth century a situation of military occupation is by no means exceptional or transitory. One juciciales almost say that in the Europe of our time an alien domination backed by mili- tary power is as normal as was the phenomenon of revolution through- out the Europe of the generation of Rehe the conclusion of renne war, many countries merely passed from one regime of foreign rule to another.
Now, there is a basic problem common to countries in such a situa- tion the problem of carrying on an inescapable collaboration with the superior power without sacrificing more than the irreducible minimum of the national interest and without losing their sense and pride of na- tionhood.
Unhappily, dene study of Vichy therefore has a living interest, because of the light it throws on the problem of other countries that are still in a similar situation. As a case study, it has the more value for the reason that Vichy has now passed into history.
Its experience therefore can be reappraised from beginning to end. The story of Vichy erroees relatively clear and narrow bounds. It deals with judciales government that began on July 10,when the two houses of the French Parliament, meeting together as a National Assembly, voted virtually unlimited powers to Marshal Petain.
It disappeared on August 20,when the Germans carried away the “Victor of Verdun” as their prisoner. Yet the problem juxiciales involves exceeds these bounds. We must look back at least to the close of the First World War in order to explore its background, as we must wait many years more before we can perceive errpres furthest consequences.
Like most golden ages, this seems more blessed in retrospect than it did to the men of the times. In this era of reputed bliss. Yet the Florioh have much reason to remem- ber the epoch before with dene. For in that time of childhood memories and the legends of the elders, France seemed to have solved her problems.
She had attained a larger economic advance than she had ever known before and one that she has perhaps never since surpassed.